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Was the 2016 United States’ presidential contest a deviating election? 
Continuity and change in the electoral map – or ‘Plus ça change, plus ç’est la 
mème géographie’ 
 
 
ABSTRACT. Several commentators before and after the 2016 US presidential election 
claimed that it involved a ‘redrawing of the country’s electoral map’, which in the context of 
the Key/Pomper classification of elections suggested that it was a deviating election, and 
potentially a critical election heralding a realignment. Analysis of the geography of the result 
of the 2016 contest, however, indicates considerable continuity at the county scale: the 
main trend was an increase in the spatial polarisation of the US electorate. Trump not only 
performed best in 2016 in those counties where Republican party candidates had done well 
at the previous nine elections, he also increased the Republican share of the votes cast in 
many of them relative to his performance in counties where the Democratic party 
candidates were strong then. The main deviations from this trend were in counties with 
large Black and/or Hispanic populations and those with relatively large numbers of well-
qualified, well-paid adults. It was not a potential critical election, therefore, but a 
continuation of a sequence now nearly four decades old. 
 
 
Several commentators have pointed out that in Achieving our Country Richard Rorty (1998) 
predicted that somewhen in the foreseeable future those suffering from the impact of globalisation 
on American communities – from deindustrialisation and the subsequent unemployment, 
stimulating poverty at worst and stagnating real incomes at best – would revolt against the political 
system. They – both trade unionists and unskilled, disorganised workers in particular – would realise 
that little was being done by politicians to protect their incomes and jobs, and that they were being 
taxed to support others. Many of the beneficiaries of public policies would either be faring better 
economically than the protesters or be (perhaps illegal) immigrants who were taking the available 
jobs at low incomes and putting pressure on welfare state benefits towards which they were 
contributing little. And then, as he put it: 
At that point, something will crack. The nonsuburban electorate will decide that the system 
has failed and start looking around for a strongman to vote for – someone willing to assure 
them that, once he is elected, the smug bureaucrats, tricky lawyers, overpaid bond 
salesmen, and postmodernist professors will no longer be calling the shots… 
To many commentators, that is exactly what happened on 8 November 2016 when Republican party 
candidate Donald Trump won the United States presidency in the Electoral College, although his 
Democratic Party opponent – Hillary Clinton – beat him by nearly three million votes in the 
nationwide ‘popularity contest’.1 
 
Trump’s campaign, according to these commentaries, focused substantially on the economic 
problems of the so-called ‘anxious class’ (called the ‘left behind’ by others), particularly white, older 
males – especially those with few educational qualifications – who were suffering from the 
combined impacts of globalisation and deindustrialisation (the latter a consequence of the 
movement of jobs to low-wage countries such as China). Trump linked that situation to the scale of 
                                                          
1 Similar populist appeals to comparable sections of the electorate there are said to have underpinned the UK’s 
vote for Brexit in June 2016 (Goodwin and Heath, 2016), as well as support for parties such as UKIP in the UK, 
the FN in France, AfD in Germany, the Swedish Democrats there and the Finns Party, the PVV in the 
Netherlands, the Austrian Freedom Party, and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party in Australia. For an 
overview, see Norris and Inglehart (2016) 
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immigration to the United States, especially of Hispanics entering (many of them illegally) through 
Mexico. He advocated a protectionist economic policy as a foundation for rebuilding American 
manufacturing industry, linked to tax cuts which would encourage investment and create a trickle-
down effect benefiting the disadvantaged workers, plus a strict immigration policy that would 
protect their interests in the labour market.2 He presented himself as an anti-establishment 
candidate tackling the liberal elite (of both parties) who dominated the ‘Washington establishment’ 
and controlled economic and social policy; he would ‘Make America Great Again’ by overturning 
their policy agenda. 
 
Many of Trump’s positions were not those traditionally taken by Republicans. As a consequence he 
did not get wide support among the ‘Republican establishment’ – a situation exacerbated by some 
of his comments being widely interpreted as misogynist and racist, which led a number of leading 
Republicans to distance themselves from him, and even deny him support (see Freedland, 2016). 
Trump therefore aimed his campaign to a considerable extent at groups that had not previously 
given his party strong electoral support, and perhaps had not been mobilised to vote at previous 
contests.  
 
In that context, a New York Times correspondent, among others, asked six months before the 
election whether Trump could ‘be the force to redraw the electoral map’.3 He argued, for example, 
that Trump’s alienation of many Hispanic-Americans led to him performing badly in the primary 
contests in states where they formed a large proportion of the population and heralded a poor 
performance in the November election there. Against that, however, he claimed that Trump’s 
criticism of international trade deals resonated with ‘blue-collar whites’ in the Rustbelt states of the 
Midwest and Northeast, groups and areas that sustained Obama at the two previous elections.  
 
Others were less clear that Trump’s support would be very different in its geographical expression 
from his predecessors’, in part because his campaign was not carefully, geographically-focused; he 
needed the traditional bedrock of Republican support to rally to his cause, along with sufficient 
numbers in at least several ‘swing states’ (not all of which were in the Rustbelt – Florida and North 
Carolina, for example) to give him the edge in the Electoral College.4 Nevertheless, immediately after 
his victory it was claimed that he ‘redrew the electoral map, from sea to shining sea’,5 although the 
details of that analysis suggested just the opposite; according to its authors, the coasts are ‘home to 
urban Democratic havens while Republicans count on the vast and less densely populated areas that 
almost always support the ticket. The suburbs that sit in between can swing elections, as they did for 
Obama in 2012, and for Trump this year’. If that was the case, then there was no fundamental 
change to the map: the Republicans did well where they usually do, the Democrats did well where 
they usually do (as Bartels showed at the state scale in an early post-election blog6) – and some 
areas where the balance sometimes tips one way and sometimes the other tipped to Trump and the 
                                                          
2 His immigration policy extended beyond the economic protections with cultural rhetoric aimed, in particular, 
at Muslims. 
3 J. Harwood ‘Could Trump be the Force to Redraw the Electoral Map?’, The New York Times, 24 may 2016, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/25/us/politics/trump-electoral-map.html 
4 See, for example, E. Cadel, ‘Trump is redrawing the election map, to Republicans’ peril’, Europe Newsweek, 
http://europe.newsweek.com/trump-election-map-493340?rm=eu 
5 L. Gamio and D. Keating, ‘How Trump redrew the electoral map, from sea to shining sea’, The Washington 
Post, 9 November 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-election/election-results-
from-coast-to-coast/ 
6 L. Bartels, ‘2016 was an ordinary election, not a realignment’, The Washington Post, 10 November 2016, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news /monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/10/2016-was-an-ordinary-election-not-
a-realignment/?utm_term=.c9aa93deca0d 
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Republicans this time, especially in those counties that were predominantly white and had relatively 
large populations with few educational qualifications.7 Plus ça change?! 
 
So was the electoral map redrawn in 2016? To address that question we undertake an empirical 
evaluation in the context of well-established theories of the United States’ recent electoral 
geography. This focuses on the pattern of voting at the county scale, through a series of regression 
models, the first of which evaluates the extent to which the geography of the 2016 result could be 
considered as deviating from that of previous elections, with subsequent steps introduced to 
account for the observed deviations. 
 
Deviating and critical elections 
 
V. O. Key’s classic 1955 paper introduced the concept of critical elections, those which initiate a 
‘sharp and durable electoral realignment between parties’ (Key, 1955, 16); they replace one 
electoral cleavage that has been sustained over a series of elections by another, which in turn lasts 
for several succeeding elections. This ideal type model was taken up by other analysts, who 
developed a wider classification of elections. For Pomper (1967) most elections are maintaining, 
reflecting continuity of support for the competing parties: each draws its main support from 
particular components of the electorate, with the divisions represented as an electoral cleavage. 
Individual elections may deviate from that sequence, reflecting circumstances particular to that 
contest such as Kennedy’s 1960 victory over Nixon, but successive contests then revert to the 
maintaining sequence. If there is no reversion to the original pattern, however, the deviating 
election may – after further contests – be identified as a converting election, initiating a switch to a 
new sequence of maintaining elections sustained by a different electoral cleavage. It may take 
several elections before that new sequence is firmly established, however, and they form realigning 
elections. 
 
Prior to 2016, recent elections formed a clear maintaining sequence, reflected in the 
characterisation of most parts of the country as either red (Republican) or blue (Democrat) state 
strongholds (Gelman, 2009). Much of the discussion before Trump’s victory suggested that the 
sequence would end then; the 2016 election would at least fall into the deviating category – only 
future elections would tell whether it was a critical election initiating a realignment. One reason for 
expecting that outcome reflects the theory’s foundations. According to Pomper (1967, 539), if there 
is a change in the basis for a party’s support then ‘The geographical distribution of each party’s vote 
would be different from the past: traditional strongholds would fall, while new areas of strength 
would become evident’. So if Trump was redrawing the US electoral map, then 2016 would at least 
be a deviating election. Such a change at the aggregate level would be matched at that of the 
individual voter by a shift away from what Converse (1966), in a major contribution to voting theory 
at that scale, termed the ‘normal vote’. A deviating election would be created by one or more of: 
voters switching their party support between elections; greater flows than usual of non-voters at 
previous elections (both abstainers and recent attainers) towards one of the parties; and greater 
flows than usual from supporters of one of the parties rather than the other into abstention. 
 
In his exploration of American electoral history, Pomper linked the geographical element of a critical 
election to his classification (Pomper, 1967, 539): 
Statistically, the vote in a critical election would not be closely associated with previous 
results. In individual states, each party’s vote would likewise tend to diverge measurably 
from traditional levels. Taking all states together, each party would experience both gains 
                                                          
7 See K, Uhrmacher, K. Schaul and D. Keating, ‘These former Obama strongholds sealed the election for 
Trump’, The Washington Post, 9 November 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/2016-
election/obama-trump-counties/. 
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and losses. The Democratic percentage of the vote, for example, would increase in erstwhile 
rock-ribbed Republican areas, but would decline in previously Democratic geographical 
bastions. 
He operationalised this argument by correlating a party’s performance at one election with that at 
the previous contest; ‘If there is high geographical continuity between two elections, regardless of 
partisan victory or defeat, the correlation coefficient should be high. If there is change, even if the 
same party wins both elections considered, we should find a relatively low coefficient’ (Pomper, 
1967, 540). A graph of those correlations for the 1828-1964 period identified five periods of change. 
 
Later analysts extended the statistical approach using factor analysis (Archer and Taylor, 1981). If all 
elections loaded on the same factor, that would indicate a single maintaining sequence; if one 
election had a lower loading than both preceding and later contests on the same component, that 
would indicate a deviating election. But if some elections loaded strongly on a first component and 
others on a second, this would indicate a realignment with the two maintaining sequences 
separated by either a single converting, or critical, election or a number whose loadings indicated a 
slow rather than immediate change (a realigning sequence). This pioneering procedure, which 
introduced the concept of a ‘geographical normal vote’, was extended to more recent contests (e.g. 
Archer and Shelley, 1986). An alternative procedure, deployed by Bartels (1998), uses lagged 
regressions to explore the extent of continuity in electoral patterns at the state level over sequences 
of elections, a procedure better suited to the study of long-term trends rather than the shorter 
period analysed here; using for the period 1868-1996 he identified no critical elections after 1972. 
 
Key’s theory and subsequent studies provided the context for re-analyses of American voting trends, 
both long- and short-term, seeking evidence, and explanations, for critical elections and realigning 
sequences (e.g. Schattschneider, 1960; Burnham, 1970). This literature has been subject to 
substantial criticism, notably by Mayhew (2000, 471: see also Mayhew, 2002, 2008) who argued that 
‘The claims of the realignments genre do not hold up well, and the genre’s illuminative power has 
not proven to be great’. His critique of the eleven separate realignment claims, most of them 
relating to changes over the long-term in the 19th and 20th centuries, does not deny that there have 
been substantial shifts in American voter opinion at certain times but rather  argues that 
realignment is not initiated by a single critical election but is rather a gradual process.8 It is likely to 
be initiated by a deviating election, therefore, one that shows significant variation in the pattern of 
voting from its predecessors and which may be followed by others that move even further from that 
norm. In that context, therefore, the question to be addressed here is not whether the 2016 result 
represented a critical election but rather whether the geographical pattern then was sufficiently 
different for it to be deemed a deviating election, potentially the initiator of more significant change 
at future contests. 
 
A largely unchanging map? 
 
As an initial exploration of whether 2016 was a deviating election from those preceding it, we 
conducted a principal components factor analysis of the percentage voting for the Republican 
party’s candidate at each presidential election over the period 1980-2016 inclusive, by county.9 The 
first component, with an eigenvalue of 7.61, accounted for 76 per cent of the variation across those 
                                                          
8 Mayhew’s overall evaluation of the ‘realigning genre’ is firmly expressed in his book’s final sentence: ‘The 
ambitious version of the realignments perspective had its fruitful days, but it is too slippery, too apocalyptic, 
and it has come to too much of a dead end’ (Mayhew, 2002, 185). But by implication the concepts of 
maintaining sequences and deviating elections are excluded from that: Mayhew’s critical attention focuses on 
patterns of change and how they appear rather than on the relatively change-less periods, such as that 
described here. 
9 Alaska and the District of Columbia are excluded from this and all further analyses. 
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ten elections; the loadings show a typical pattern for such a time series (Table 1), with the highest 
values at the centre of the sequence and the lowest at the end-dates (Taylor, 1988). This suggests a 
consistent geographical pattern of support across all ten contests, but with the elections of Reagan 
in 1980 and Trump in 2016 not as strongly linked to the general pattern as the other eight: only 59 
per cent (0.772) of the variation in the distribution of Trump’s support across the 3,076 counties can 
be accounted for by the variation in Republican support at the previous nine elections, perhaps 
indicative of it being a deviating election. 
 
The geography of Trump’s support may have deviated considerably from the general pattern of 
Republican voting over the preceding three decades, therefore. This is only partly confirmed by the 
scatter-plot in Figure 1, however, which shows the relationship between the percentage voting for 
Trump and the mean Republican percentage across the previous nine elections. (There is an almost 
perfect relationship between this mean value and the scores on the principal component;10 we use 
the mean in the following analyses because it is easier to interpret than the factor scores.) In 
general, Trump performed best where Republicans performed well in the recent past, although with 
considerable variation about that trend (the r2 value is 0.56). Further, the large number of counties 
to the left of the principal diagonal line in Figure 1, which depicts where X = Y, shows not only that 
Trump performed better than his predecessors in those counties where the Republican mean vote 
exceeded 54 per cent (the mean for all nine elections, shown by the vertical line in Figure 1) but also 
in those where mean support for the Republican candidates exceeded 40 per cent. Trump 
outperformed his predecessor candidates in those counties where the party was already strong. 
Most of the counties under the principal diagonal, on the other hand, are where the Republicans 
performed below average across the nine elections – providing strong implicit evidence that the 
2016 election not only continued but also exaggerated the spatial polarisation of the US electorate 
that has characterised the last few decades (Johnston et al., 2016; Holbrook, 2016), paralleling the 
ideological polarisation of the American electorate and its legislature (Campbell, 2016). The 
Republicans’ candidate performed even better in 2016 in the counties where his predecessors 
performed well on average between 1980 and 2012; and, complementing that pattern, Clinton 
performed even better in 2016 in those counties where Democratic candidates were particularly 
strong than they had done at the previous elections. If 2016 was a deviating election, therefore, the 
main feature of the deviation was not the creation of a new geographical pattern of voting but 
rather an accentuation of an ongoing pattern of greater spatial polarisation. 
 
One partial explanation for those patterns is that both candidates performed relatively poorly in 
Utah where an independent candidate – Evan McMullin – came third with 20 per cent of the votes in 
his home state; nevertheless, Trump outvoted Clinton by more than 20 percentage points there. 
Model I in Table 2 includes a dummy variable that contrasts Utah counties with those in the rest of 
the United States; the coefficient suggests that Trump obtained on average 18.57 fewer percentage 
points across Utah’s counties than he would have done if McMullin (a conservative former CIA 
officer) had not run. (Republican candidates averaged 64 per cent of the votes across Utah’s 
counties at previous contests; Trump got 46.8.) 
 
Commentaries written both before and immediately after the election, many based on polling and 
other data, suggested that Trump performed particularly well among older white males who had not 
benefited from the liberal trade regime of the last few decades but badly among Blacks and 
Hispanics; the latter groups had traditionally provided strong support for Democratic party 
candidates and additionally in 2016 many of them were alienated by some of his campaign rhetoric 
– against Muslims and Mexican immigrants, for example. To represent the geographies of these 
elements of the contemporary American economic and social landscape, eight relevant variables for 
                                                          
10 Mean%Republican = 54.65 + 10.27Score: r2 = 0.987. 
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which data were available at the county scale (mainly for 2010) were selected.11 Because of likely 
collinearity, these were subject to a principal components factor analysis that yielded three 
interpretable factors accounting for 77 per cent of the variation across counties. The loadings on 
those three factors – after direct oblimin rotation to obtain the best fit to simple structure – are 
shown in Table 3, and the factors were labelled: 
I:  Black, Unemployed and Poor, reflecting the three largest positive loadings; 
II:  Qualified and High Income, again reflecting the two high positive loadings; and 
III: Hispanic, reflecting the large negative loading. 
The scores on these three components were entered into a multiple regression – Model II in Table 
2– along with the mean Republican vote and the Utah dummy variable to explore the deviations 
from the general trend of preceding contests. 
 
That regression increased the R2 value from 0.57 to 0.80 (Table 2).All three variables representing 
the components are statistically significant at the 0.05 level or better (as shown by the ratios of the 
coefficients to their standard errors). The greater the percentage of a county’s population who were 
Black, and/or unemployed, and/or living in poverty (the first component), the smaller Trump’s share 
of the votes cast – all other variables being held constant. Similarly the larger the relative size of a 
county’s Hispanic population (the third factor) the smaller Trump’s share (per cent Hispanic has a 
negative loading on that factor; Trump performed better the larger a county’s non-Hispanic White 
population). Not unexpectedly, Trump did not win additional support to that of his Republican 
predecessors in counties with large ethnic minority populations (on whose support Clinton strongly 
depended). Finally, and of the three this variable has the largest coefficient, the more affluent a 
county’s population (the larger its median income and the greater the percentage with degrees) the 
smaller Trump’s share of the votes – the corollary being that, as anticipated, he performed better 
than average in areas where the less well-qualified, white working class dominated. 
 
A plot of the predicted vote for Trump according to Model II against his actual share (Figure 2) shows 
an even closer fit than in Figure 1 – not surprisingly given the larger R2 value associated with the 
latter Model (Table 2). Many of the counties that lie above the X=Y line, where Trump performed 
better than expected, have high predicted values (greater than 50 per cent), however. This further 
supports the argument that a major feature of the geography of the 2016 result was even greater 
spatial polarisation in the pattern of voting for the two parties’ candidates. Trump performed better 
than expected in the counties where his party has traditionally performed well, and where there are 
relatively few poor Blacks, or unemployed, or affluent voters, or Hispanics. 
 
Finally in this model-fitting exercise we explored further where Trump performed relatively well and 
badly in the context of the election’s main battlegrounds. All recent elections have been won or lost 
in a minority of ‘swing states’ where the gap between the two parties is relatively small; the 
remainder have been safe for either the Republican or the Democratic Party (the red and blue states 
respectively). In order to win in 2016, therefore, Trump had not only to retain control of all of the 
red states but also to gain victory in a sufficient number of the swing states (especially those with 
relatively large Electoral College delegations), most of which were won by Obama in 2012.12 Model 
III thus introduced a three-fold classification of states with two dummy variables contrasting 
counties in the red and swing states respectively with those in the blue states (where the Democrats 
                                                          
11 Because there is little geographic variability in the sex ratio, we did not include a variable for % male. All of 
the data analysed here were downloaded from the US Counties Database: https://www.census.gov/support 
/USACdataDownloads.html – access 11 April 2017. Exploratory investigations identified no other variables – 
such as might represent areas of post-industrial decline – that were closely related to Trump’s performance. 
12 The following were designated as swing states: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Nevada, New Hampshire, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin; all except North Carolina were won by Obama in 
2012 (with an average margin of 5.4 percentage points). 
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have traditionally performed well). The results show Trump led Clinton by an average gap of 5.4 
percentage points in the red states, but by only 0.87 points in the swing states (Table 2). The latter 
was sufficient to deliver victory in the Electoral College, because of Trump’s narrow victories in 
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, but the overall trend remained greater polarisation; holding 
constant Republican performance at previous contests plus the socio-demographic and -economic 
characteristics of the county populations represented by the three components, Trump performed 
best in 2016 where his party was already strong.13 
 
A plot of the predicted vote according to Model III against Trump’s actual share (Figure 3) shows that 
even with the inclusion of state types in the regression model there was still clear evidence of spatial 
polarisation, of Trump’s support mainly being much greater than expected in counties where the 
Republicans were traditionally strong. Of the 175 counties where Trump‘s share was more than 10 
percentage points greater than expected, 159 were counties where he was predicted to get at least 
50 per cent of the votes, and there were only 16 where that prediction was less than 50 per cent. 
The dominant conclusion from this modelling is that 2016 was not a deviating election but rather 
one in which the geography of support for the two parties was a further element in a maintaining 
sequence but more spatially polarised that at the previous nine contests. 
 
This leaves 18 per cent of the variation in Trump’s support unaccounted for; Figure 3 shows only a 
small number of substantial outliers from the general relationship. The largest residuals – the 
counties where Trump’s vote is either substantially under- or substantially over-predicted – may 
however highlight other features of his geography of support. Table 4 groups the absolute residuals 
(the difference between the predicted and actual percentage voting for Trump) into eight 
categories, showing by how many percentage points the model under- (the positive residuals) or 
over-predicted (the negative residuals) Trump’s vote share, and presents their distribution across 
the three state types. Three clear patterns emerge. First, there is little difference across the eight 
columns in the percentage of counties in each category that were in the blue states: just over 16 per 
cent of all counties comprise those Democratic strongholds and a very similar percentage appears in 
each column. Second, the largest residuals – both positive and negative – occurred in the red states; 
counties where Trump’s support was both substantially under- and over-predicted were 
concentrated in areas where the Republicans are traditionally strong. Over-predictions, for example, 
characterised places with traditionally strong Republican support but large Hispanic populations. 
Finally, and complementing that pattern, the swing states were those where the predictions were 
most accurate; over one-third of all the counties where the residual was +/-5 percentage points or 
less were concentrated there.  
 
Five states had substantial concentrations of counties where Trump’s support was under-predicted 
by more than 10 percentage points: Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Texas and West Virginia. Six more 
had concentrations of counties where his support was over-predicted by ten points or more: 
Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Montana, North Dakota and South Dakota. (Only Georgia appears in both 
lists, suggesting greater polarisation towards both parties there than elsewhere.) Some of those 
residuals reflected a greater intra-state polarisation of the electorate than the general relationships 
                                                          
13 This conclusion is sustained by separate regressions of the residuals from Model II on Trump’s performance 
for each of the three types of state. Where Y is Trump’s percentage of the votes cast in each county and X is 
the predicted percentage from Model II in Table 2, the three regressions are: 
Red states: Y = 3.06 + 0.98X (r2 = 0.74) 
Blue states: Y = 1.74 + 0.99X (r2 = 0.83) 
Swing states: Y = 2.50 + 0.99X (r2 = 0.86) 
Trump got the greatest above-predicted average return in red states (the highest intercept was for those 
states) and least in the blue states. All three relationships are strongly linear with the regression coefficients 
very close to 1.0. 
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uncovered. In Texas, for example, the twenty-four counties where Trump’s vote was over-predicted 
by 5 percentage points or more were on average 66 per cent Hispanic, compared to 32 per cent 
across all of the state’s 254 counties, and only 20 per cent in the counties where his vote was 
substantially under-predicted. As anticipated, he performed relatively badly in areas of Hispanic 
concentration.  
 
But there is little – if any – evidence of Rorty’s imagined ‘nonsuburban electorate’ voting for a 
strongman. Around New York City, whereas Trump’s performance was under-predicted by 9, 10 and 
10 points by Model III in suburban Nassau, Richmond and Suffolk counties, it was accurately 
predicted in New York County itself, and also in Queen’s, King’s and Bronx. In Illinois, Model III 
successfully predicted Trump’s performance not only in Cook County but also in its neighbours – 
DuPage, Lake and Will. The inner cities remained Democratic strongholds – in large part because 
they contain the main concentrations of Blacks and Hispanics. Trump may have attracted support in 
those extra-metropolitan parts of the Rust Belt where deindustrialisation hit hardest, but only 
slightly since his victories in most of the swing states were small. This is suggested by Figure 4, which 
shows the relationship between the predicted (from Model I) and actual Trump performance in 
those counties that had small minority populations (Blacks and Hispanics together formed less than 
10 per cent of the population) but high levels of poverty (20 per cent or more of families). These are 
the areas where the disadvantaged whites were concentrated; of the 200 counties, 47 were in 
Kentucky, 23 in Tennessee, 18 in West Virginia, 17 in Missouri and 14 in Oklahoma – depressed rural 
and small town areas (many with economies formerly based on mining). The Republicans 
traditionally performed relatively well there, with a predicted Republican percentage based on the 
results of previous elections of over 50; most were in red states and so Trump’s victories there in 
2016 would not have contributed further to his Electoral College success.14 These were not the Rust 
Belt declining urban areas where the disadvantaged white working class are concentrated and where 
Trump was supposed to have done well. If we look just at counties in three of the main Rust Belt 
states – Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania – with small (less than 10 per cent) Black and Hispanic 
populations (Figure 5), again the standard relationship against the predictions from Model I appears. 
Trump did better than predicted in many of those counties, suggesting that he won over enough 
former Democrat voters to ensure his victory in the white working-class parts of those key states,15 
but his better-than-expected performance in the separately-identified counties with high poverty 
levels only occurred where he was predicted to get a large share of the votes based on the 
Republicans’ previous performance.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
‘The geographical distribution of each party’s vote would be different from the past:  
traditional strongholds would fall, while new areas of strength would become evident’. 
(Pomper, 1968, 539) 
‘In the United States … [p]olitical campaigns consist in large part of reminding  
voters of their partisan identities – “mobilizing” them to support their group at the polls’. 
                                                          
14 Alternative formulations were used to identify the extent to which Trump benefited from his appeal to the 
disadvantaged white working class. A model was estimated including the percentage of the population aged 65 
and over, the percentage in poverty plus the interaction between the age and poverty variables (thus 
identifying those counties with large old and disadvantaged populations), and the mean Republican 
performance 1980-2012 and a Utah dummy. The interaction variable, like the others, was statistically 
significantly related to Trump’s performance across all counties. A non-Utah county with a mean Republican 
1980-2012 vote percentage (54.64) and mean populations aged over 65 (15.97) and in poverty (15.4) would 
have a predicted Trump vote percentage of 64.23.  
15 Trump performed well below predicted in the counties containing the main cities of those states (Cleveland 
OH, Columbus OH, Detroit MI, and Philadelphia PA). 
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(Achen and Bartels, 2016, 311) 
 
Critical elections ‘disrupt the continuity of previous electoral eras and initiate new eras of stability’ 
(Lichtman, 1976, 318) – and usually occur not because of ‘the personal appeals of particular 
candidates, but rather from the ramifications of … crises’ such as war or depression (p.344). The 
concept implies a massive shift in voting behaviour, and critics (such as Carmines and Stimson, 1989) 
claim that is extremely unlikely in a polity as large (both numerically and territorially) and diverse as 
the United States. Such shifts are likely to be relatively slow and spatially uneven and, as Nardulli 
(1995, 17) expresses it, ‘critical realignments are temporally structured and geographically 
concentrated phenomena that represent marked and enduring breaks in regional electoral 
patterns’: they are not ‘majestic national movements’ but rather changes that are initiated in parts 
of the country and transmitted outward through a series of pulses until a nationwide shift can be 
discerned. 
 
The presence of a critical election – which may be the beginning of a realigning sequence – can only 
be identified some years after that event, since its existence depends on what happens at 
subsequent elections. But an election can be identified as a deviating contest if it is characterised by 
a geographical pattern to the support for one of the political parties that deviates substantially from 
that of its immediate predecessors – either across the entire country, which is what the ‘simplistic’ 
theory suggests, or at least in substantial sections of it. On such criteria, the analyses reported here 
have strongly suggested that the 2016 US Presidential election does not qualify. An R2 value of 0.57 
(Model I in Table 2) might initially be interpreted as a major shift, that the geography of support for 
Trump was so different from that of Republican candidates over the preceding nine elections that a 
major reorganisation of support for the country’s two parties had possibly been initiated, and could 
be extended at further contests. But the main cause of that relatively low correlation (Pomper, 1967, 
shows only four as low or lower over the period 1832-1964) was neither a major change across the 
country in where the Republicans won most support nor such a change in one region only. The main 
change involved an accentuation of the existing geography, a continuation of the state-level 
‘competitive equilibrium’ Bartels (1998) identifies in his study of long-term support for the 
Republican party’s candidates and the low levels of electoral volatility at the end of the twentieth 
century. At the county scale the American electorate has become increasingly polarised spatially 
over recent decades (Johnston et al., 2016), and the 2016 election result further exaggerated that 
national divide: the Republican candidate (Trump) performed even better than his predecessors in 
the (red) states and counties therein where they have been strong since at least 1980; and the 
Democratic candidate (Clinton) performed better than her predecessors in the (blue) states and 
counties therein where they have been strong over the same period. Those changes were in part 
ameliorated in particular types of county: Trump performed relatively badly in red state counties 
with large Black and/or Hispanic populations and in those with relatively large young and well-
qualified residents. The 2016 contest was won and lost in a small number of swing states, notably 
but not only a number in the Rust Belt where Trump increased the Republicans’ vote shares in places 
that already provided that party with majority or near-majority support. 
 
Table 5 summarises these findings by contrasting those counties where Trump’s performance was 
substantially over-predicted and under-predicted by Model I (by 10 percentage points or more in 
each case) with those where the prediction was relatively close to the outcome (deviating by less 
than 10 percentage points). The first row of means – for the average Republican performance over 
the nine previous elections – does not support the general argument developed here regarding 
greater spatial polarisation in 2016; the counties with substantial over- and under-predicted vote 
shares for Trump had significantly smaller Republican vote shares than those where the predictions 
were more accurate. 
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The reason for this is that the trend towards or away from the Republican norm was significantly 
influenced by the counties’ socio-economic and -demographic characteristics, independent of their 
previous partisan leanings. This is made clear by the next block of data in Table 5, which refer to the 
eight variables selected to represent those characteristics. All have highly significant F-values from 
univariate analyses of variance across the three groups. Counties where Trump’s performance was 
substantially over-predicted had more than twice as many graduates in their adult populations as 
those where it was substantially under-predicted, for example; similarly the former group of 
counties had three times as many Blacks and Hispanics as the latter group, as well as individuals with 
much larger incomes. These differences are confirmed by the mean factor scores: the areas where 
Trump performed relatively badly were characterised by high percentages of Blacks, the 
unemployed and those in poverty (Factor 1), high percentages of well-paid graduates (Factor 2), and 
high percentages of Hispanics (Factor 3). And the final block, showing the percentage of counties in 
each of the three state types, indicates that those where Trump’s performance was substantially 
over-predicted were predominantly located in the swing states. He won in the Electoral College 
because he held on to the Republicans’ core support in the red states plus gained sufficient votes in 
the swing-state counties whose populations were most likely to support him (poor, less-qualified, 
non-Hispanic Whites). 
 
Whereas aggregate data analyses of voting behaviour have concentrated on sequences of 
maintaining elections, interrupted by occasional deviating elections a small number of which have 
initiated realignments, analyses using survey data have focused on the parallel concept of a normal 
vote (Converse, 1966) – of most people continuing to vote for the same party, for the same reasons, 
over a sequence of contests. So if 2016 was very largely a continuing election, survey data should 
indicate little change.16  That is what the 2016 exit polls show, when compared to those conducted 
after the 2012 election. At the latter, 92 per cent of registered Democrats voted for Obama as did 6 
per cent of registered Republicans and 45 per cent of registered Independents; the comparable 
figures for 2016 were 89, 7 and 42. It seems unlikely that Trump ‘converted’ many former 
Democrats. More likely is that his victory came about because of either or both of: more former 
Democrats than former Republicans abstained in 2016; and more non-voters at previous elections 
turned out and voted Republican rather than Democrat in 2016. Nor were there any substantial 
shifts in the percentages within particular socio-economic and -demographic groups voting for 
Trump in 2016 compared to Romney in 2012: few of the differences by age, race/ethnicity, gender, 
education, income or ideology changed by more than a few percentage points. The 2016 American 
National Election Study Time Series Study17 shows a net swing from Democrat to Republican 
between 2012 and 2016: 83 per cent of Obama supporters voted for Clinton and 12 per cent for 
Trump, whereas 88 per cent of Romney’s supporters voted for Trump in 2016 and only 6 per cent for 
Clinton. Most of those who abstained in 2012 did so again in 2016, but of those who voted at the 
latter date slightly more were for Clinton than for Trump. 
 
Trump did not redraw the electoral map of the United States, therefore. The main feature of the 
geography of his support was that it furthered the ongoing spatial polarisation of the country’s 
electorate: in many parts of the red areas the topography tilted red-wards whereas in most blue 
areas it tilted blue-wards. He won in the Electoral College – having lost the popular vote by more 
than two millions out of some 135 million cast. That tilting of some states – and in particular of some 
counties within those states – slightly red-wards, perhaps by winning support among some of those, 
notably the white, disadvantaged, small-town working class many of whom usually fail to vote, was 
sufficient to swing a number of states marginally in his favour. And so when he – or a Republican 
                                                          
16 Summaries of the findings are reported on the relevant Wikipedia pages: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
United_States_presidential_election,_2012 and https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_ 
presidential_election,_2016 - accessed 5 December 2016. 
17 http://www.electionstudies.org/studypages/anes_timeseries_2016/anes_timeseries_2016.htm. 
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successor – defends that victory in 2020 it will be in the same places as before, not only in 2012 but 
in every contest since 1980. Plus ça change, plus c’est la mème géographie. 
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Table 1. Factor loadings for the percentage of the votes won by the Republican party in each state at 
the 1980-2016 Presidential elections. 
 
Election 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Loading 0.75 0.89 0.85 0.83 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.89 0.88 0.77 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Results of linear regression models predicting support for Trump at the 2016 US Presidential 
election. (Standard errors are given in brackets beneath the coefficients.) 
 
Model I II III  . 
Constant 1.76 11.43 12.56 
 (0.99) (0.75) (0.72) 
Mean Republican Vote 1980-2012 1.14 0.96 0.88 
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Utah -18.57 -12.95 -14.66 
 (1.89) (1.29) (0.72) 
Black/Unemployed/Poor Factor - -2.89 -3.64 
  (0.14) (0.14) 
Qualified/High Income Factor - -6.59 -5.97 
  (0.13) (0.13) 
Hispanic Factor - 2.62 2.73  
  (0.17) (0.12) 
Red State  - - 5.40 
   (0.37) 
Swing State - - 0.87 
   (0.38) 
R2 0.57 0.80 0.82 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Factor loadings from a principal components factor analysis, with direct oblimin rotation, of 
eight variables representing aspects of the socio-economic characteristics of county populations. 
 
Factor I II III . 
% Unemployed 0.76 -0.30 -0.10 
% Black 0.83 -0.04 -0.08 
% Non-Hispanic White -0.71 -0.03 0.77 
% In Poverty 0.67 -0.62 -0.30 
Median Family Income -0.23 0.93 0.08 
% With Degree -0.14 0.85 -0.05 
% Aged 65 and Over -0.48 -0.52 0.39 
% Hispanic 0.01 0.02 -0.96 
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Table 4. The percentage distributions of unstandardised residuals from Model II in Table 2, by state 
type. 
 
Residual -15< -10:-15 -5:-10 0:-5 0:+5 +5:+10 +10:+15 +15< 
Red state 69 73 63 49 49 62 73 73 
Blue state 19 17 14 18 16 17 15 15 
Swing state 12 10 23 34 35 21 12 12 
N 32 154 456 893 890 473 149 26 
 
 
Table 5. Characteristics of the counties where Trump’s support was substantially under- and over-
predicted by Model I. (Substantial under-prediction is a standardised residual of +10 percentage 
points or greater; substantial over-prediction is a standardised residual of -10 percentage points or 
greater.) 
 Over-  Under- 
 predicted Neither predicted F sig. 
Mean Republican Per Cent 1980-2012 50.3 56.3 51.7 98.5 0.000 
Per Cent with Degree (Mean) 29.2 17.4 12.6 802.8 0.000 
Per Cent Black (Mean) 14.1 8.3 4.8 54.3 0.000 
Per Cent Hispanic (Mean) 15.6 7.4 4.9 101.5 0.000 
Per Cent in Poverty (Mean) 14.5 15.0 18.1 49.1 0.000 
Per Cent Aged 65 Plus (Mean) 12.7 16.4 17.2 217.1 0.000 
Per Cent Unemployed (Mean) 7.1 6.8 7.3 7.2 0.001 
Per Cent Non-Hispanic White (Mean) 63.4 80.6 86.9 230.6 0.000 
Median Family Income ($) (Mean) 50,608 41,324 35,593 362.1 0.000 
Factor I Score (Mean) 0.41 -0.10 -0.13 57.3 0.000 
Factor II Score (Mean) 1.11 -0.12 -0.76 663.3 0.000 
Factor III Score (Mean) -0.69 0.10 0.31 165.3 0.000 
Red State (Per Cent of Counties) 39 32 29 
Blue State (Per Cent of Counties) 54 14 32 
Swing State (Per Cent of Counties) 83 7 10  . 
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Figure 1. Scatterplot showing the relationship between Trump’s percentage share of the votes in 
each county in 2016 and the mean percentage for the Republican candidates there at the 1980-2012 
elections. (The diagonal line shows the relationship where X = Y.) 
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Figure 2. Scatterplot showing the relationship between Trump’s percentage share of the votes in 
each county in 2016 and the predicted percentage from the Model II regression in Table 2. (The 
diagonal line shows the relationship where X = Y.) 
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Figure 3. Scatterplot showing the relationship between Trump’s percentage share of the votes in 
each county in 2016 and the predicted percentage from the Model III regression in Table 2. (The 
diagonal line shows the relationship where X = Y.) 
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Figure 4. Scatterplot showing the relationship between Trump’s percentage share of the votes in 
each county in 2016 and the predicted percentage from the Model I regression in Table 2, in those 
counties with small minority populations and high poverty levels, by state type. (The diagonal line 
shows the relationship where X = Y.) 
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Figure 5. Scatterplot showing the relationship between Trump’s percentage share of the votes in 
each county in 2016 and the predicted percentage from the Model I regression in Table 2, in those 
Michigan, Pennsylvania and Ohio counties with small minority populations and high poverty levels. 
(The diagonal line shows the relationship where X = Y.) 
 
 
 
